

25X1

DRAFT
24 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Strategic Warning Review Group Meeting of
19 November 1975

1. The first meeting of the Strategic Warning Review Group was held in the Intelligence Community Staff Conference Room (6E0708), Central Intelligence Agency, at 1000 hours, 19 November 1975. The meeting was chaired by Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC), who established this Group to review the functioning of the strategic warning process, as stipulated in DCID 1/5. A list of attendees is attached.

A. ISSUING A STRATEGIC WARNING NOTICE

2. The members agreed that the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) should adhere to existing DCID 1/5 guidelines concerning its authority and areas of substantive responsibility. Recognizing that there could be some duplication of effort between the SWS and the NIOs preceding and during times of crises, all members agreed that the SWS should take the lead in any areas with big "W" warning implications, and the NIOs should be responsible for little "w" warning areas. In those fuzzy, gray areas between little "w" and big "W", some members saw no serious problem with the SWS's producing a Strategic Warning Notice (SWN) at a

MORI/CDF Pages 1-5

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

[redacted]
time when the NIOs might also be preparing an Alert Memorandum (AM). It would be up to the DCI to decide whether to issue one or both. Other members did envision some problems, but all agreed that the procedures for issuing an SWN, like those established for the AM process, should be flexible, and that the NIOs and the SWS should be in close touch.

25X1 3. [redacted] added that he hoped the SWS would be recognized as an entity in itself and that the NIOs would contact the SWS on activities related to big "W" warning implications.

4. Several other procedural points concerning the issuance of an SWN were discussed:

-- the issuance of a negative strategic warning notice, the pros and cons;

-- the use of NOIWON, LDX, etc. before and after issuing an SWN;

-- soliciting the Community's view concerning a forthcoming SWN through consultation and/or coordination;

-- notifying consumers when a crisis has either abated or increased sufficiently to warrant an update;

-- using the AM dissemination list as a guide to SWN dissemination;

-- educating the consumer, e.g., the NSC Staff and WSAG, on both the SWS and the SWN.

25X1

[redacted]
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1

5. General Wilson endorsed the mission of the SWS and said we should assure that it takes the lead in those areas for which it is responsible. He proposed that [] and the SWS take the lead in preparing a document which would spell out the SWNs. [] C/PRD/ICS, was asked to provide staff assistance and comments. It was agreed that, in general, the form and content of this document--which should ultimately be approved by USIB--should resemble the procedures established for the Alert Memoranda.

25X1

25X1

B. SWS ACCESS TO ALL APPROPRIATE INTELLIGENCE

6. [] indicated that he was not aware of any serious access problems. [] said the situation vis-a-vis DDO/CIA has improved, but he was still concerned about the US Navy's compartmentation of some intelligence. General Wilson suggested that he and [] [] discuss the matter with Admiral Inman to see if anything could be done about improving SWS access to this intelligence.

25X1

7. Mr. Baraz, State Dept., asked if the SWS was on distribution for material coming through "the Washington-Moscow link." SWS is not, though the NMCC probably is. General Wilson suggested that SWS look into this and any other areas where it should be on priority distribution and is not.

C. SWS MONTHLY REPORT DISTRIBUTION

8. There seems to be no problem in this area, even though the Monthly is issued only at a high classification level. General Wilson

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1

[redacted] suggested that some consumers (e.g., NSC Staff, WHSR, JCS) also be put on distribution. No one objected and General Wilson asked General [redacted] to plan to do this; General Wilson will inform Mr. Colby.

25X1

D. STAFFING THE SWS

10. General Wilson expressed his concern about the lack of personnel support from State, Army, and Navy and said he would pursue this matter further on his own.

E. NEWSWEEK QUERY

11. General Wilson provided some guidelines to [redacted] in answering some thirteen questions that a Newsweek correspondent had asked about the SWS. [redacted] said he would have no problem in answering the questions at an unclassified level.

25X1

F. ADDITIONAL TASKS FOR SWS

12. [redacted] indicated that he was considering additional tasks for the SWS, specifically studies on indicators and warning doctrine. General Wilson endorsed this approach, promised IC Staff support, but cautioned the SWS not to undertake too much, given its small staff.

25X1

[redacted]
Executive Secretary, SWRG
PRD/ICS

Attachment [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied